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Abstract
Same-sex marriage is here. Massachusetts now recognizes such marriages, and
increasing numbers of same-sex couples have married. Other states have virtually
the same status: Vermont recognizes “civil unions,” and California recognizes
”domestic partnerships,” that have virtually all the rights of marriage. Are these
statuses exportable? Will same-sex unions be recognized in other states? The
answer should not be mysterious. There is a well developed body of law on the
question of whether and when to recognize extraterritorial marriages that are con-
trary to the forum’s public policy. Assuming that courts decide to follow that law,
the answer is, it depends. This article will offer a short overview. The answer is
somewhat complex, but there are large areas of clarity.
(2143)
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
INTERSTATE RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGES AND
CIVIL UNIONS:  A HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES
ANDREW KOPPELMAN†
If there is one thing that the people are entitled to expect from their lawmakers,
it is rules of law that will enable individuals to tell whether they are married and,
if so, to whom.
– Justice Robert Jackson
1
Same-sex marriage is here.  Massachusetts now recognizes such
marriages,2 and increasing numbers of same-sex couples have mar-
ried.  Other states have virtually the same status:  Vermont and Con-
necticut recognize “civil unions,”3 and California recognizes “domestic
partnerships”4 that have virtually all the rights of marriage.5  Are these
† Professor of Law and Political Science, Northwestern University. Thanks to
Heather Benno, Jane Brock, and Marcia Lehr for their assistance, and to the members
of the Northwestern Zodiac Workshop for helpful comments.  This research was sup-
ported by the Northwestern University School of Law Summer Faculty Research Pro-
gram and the Kathleen M. Haight Fund.
1
Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 553 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
2
See In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 570 (Mass. 2004);
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
3
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a) (2002) grants parties to a civil union “all the
same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law, whether they derive from
statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common law or any other source of civil
law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage.”  Section 14 of the Connecticut act de-
clares that
[p]arties to a civil union shall have all the same benefits, protections and re-
sponsibilities under law, whether derived from the general statutes, adminis-
trative regulations or court rules, policy, common law or any other source of
civil law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage, which is defined as the union
of one man and one woman.
2005 Conn. Pub. Act No. 05-10, available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/act/Pa/
2005PA-00010-R00SB-00963-PA.htm.
4
CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a) (West 2004) declares that
[r]egistered domestic partners shall have the same rights, protections, and
benefits, and shall be subject to the same responsibilities, obligations, and du-
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statuses exportable?  Will same-sex unions be recognized in other
states?6
The answer should not be mysterious.  There is a well-developed
body of law on the question of whether and when to recognize extra-
territorial marriages that are contrary to the forum’s public policy.
Assuming that courts decide to follow that law,7 the answer is some-
what complex, but there are large areas of clarity.  This Article will of-
fer a short overview.8
The cases involving same-sex marriages that come before the
courts fall into four categories.  Each category presents different prob-
lems and requires a different analysis.  Once courts have determined
in which category a case belongs, the analysis should be straightfor-
ward.
ties under law, whether they derive from statutes, administrative regulations,
court rules, government policies, common law, or any other provisions or
sources of law, as are granted to and imposed upon spouses. 
The only distinction from Vermont is that California domestic partners, in filing state
income tax returns, “shall use the same filing status as is used on their federal income
tax returns.”  Id. § 297.5(g).  This proviso was added because legislators feared that
conflicting tax codes would make same-sex households more likely to be audited.  See
Lisa Leff, Davis Signs Domestic Partner Bill, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, Sept. 20,
2003, at A6.
5
For economy, I will refer to both statuses hereinafter as “civil unions.”  There are
also a number of other state “domestic partnership” laws, but these are far weaker, car-
rying with them only a small subset of the rights of married couples.  For a survey, see
American Bar Association Section of Family Law, A White Paper:  An Analysis of the Law
Regarding Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 38 FAM. L.Q. 339,
379-97, 414-16 (2004).  On the specific deficiencies of one such statute, see David M.
Stauss, Note, The End or Just the Beginning for Gay Rights Under the New Jersey Constitution?:
The New Jersey Domestic Partnership Act, Lewis v. Harris, and the Future of Gay Rights in New
Jersey, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 289, 306-18 (2004).
6
This Article only addresses the issues raised by marriage recognition.  I do not
consider the special problems raised by same-sex divorce.  See Herma Hill Kay, Same-Sex
Divorce in the Conflict of Laws, 15 KING’S C. L.J. 63 (2004).  I largely agree with the analy-
sis of Barbara J. Cox, Using an “Incidents of Marriage” Analysis When Considering Interstate
Recognition of Same-Sex Couples’ Marriages, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 13
WIDENER L.J. 699, 729-46 (2004), but most of the cases she considers involve the disso-
lution question, which I do not take up here.
7
It is, of course, possible that courts will be so hostile to same-sex couples that
they will refuse to recognize same-sex marriages under any circumstances.  Such a posi-
tion would, however, raise serious constitutional difficulties.  See Andrew Koppelman,
Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Civil Unions After Lawrence v. Texas, 65 OHIO ST. L.J.
1264, 1267 (2005).
8
The argument will be more fully developed in a longer work, which will be pub-
lished as a book.
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The first category, “evasive” marriages,9 includes cases in which
parties have traveled out of their home state for the express purpose
of evading that state’s prohibition of their marriage and returned
home immediately after being married.  Such marriages will be invalid
if they violate the strong public policy of the couple’s home state.
Discerning public policy will be easy in the forty states that have legis-
lation on the books declaring that they will not recognize foreign
same-sex marriages; in other states, the outcome will be uncertain and
will turn on the details of local law.
The second category, “migratory” marriages, includes cases in
which the parties did not intend to evade the law of any state when
they married, but they contracted a marriage valid where they lived
and subsequently moved to a state where their marriage was prohib-
ited.  An example would be a same-sex couple who were residents of
Massachusetts when they married and who later moved to Pennsylva-
nia.  These are the hard cases, on which authority is sparse and con-
flicting.  Absent a statutory ban on same-sex marriage, the state’s pub-
lic policy will not be clear enough to justify withholding recognition.
Even if there is such a statute, the strength of the public policy it re-
flects will depend on which incident of marriage is at issue.  Property
claims arising out of a marriage cannot simply be annulled by the de-
cision of one spouse to move to another state, and the marriage must
be an impediment to the remarriage of either of the partners.
Moreover, if the incident of marriage in question is one that could
have been conferred by contract under the forum’s law, such as the
right to make medical decisions for one’s partner, then the state’s pol-
icy cannot be offended by the mere fact that the couple took advan-
tage of a legal shortcut to that right created by another state’s law.
The third category, and the one that most urgently demands clar-
ity, is “visitor” marriages, in which a couple or a member of a couple is
temporarily present in a state that does not recognize their marriages.
Though there is little authority that addresses this precise question,
such marriages should always be recognized, for all purposes.  Any
other result is inconsistent with the constitutional right of citizens to
travel.
The fourth category is “extraterritorial” cases, in which the parties
have never lived within the state but the marriage is relevant to litiga-
tion conducted there.  For example, after the death intestate of one
9
I borrow this useful nomenclature from Developments in the Law—The Law of Mar-
riage and Family, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1996, 2038 (2003) [hereinafter Developments].
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spouse, the other may seek to inherit property that was located within
the forum state.  In these cases, there is clear authority in favor of rec-
ognition.
I.  THE RELEVANCE OF THE MISCEGENATION10 CASES
Unfortunately, before we can examine the relevant authority in
this area, we must begin by clearing away some trash:  legally irrele-
vant authority that is commonly thought to have some bearing on the
question of marriage recognition.  We must also, in deference to the
political realities within which courts operate, disregard some very
powerful arguments which, if accepted, moot the recognition ques-
tion.
Many people have confusedly thought, and some still think, that
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution11 requires states to
recognize marriages from other states.  But this has never been the
law.  The clause requires states only to recognize other states’ judg-
ments rendered after adversarial proceedings.12  There is almost no
authority for the proposition that full faith and credit applies to mar-
10
I will not put scare quotes around this word, but use it with the same caveats set
forth by Peggy Pascoe:
Many scholars avoid using the word miscegenation, which dates to the 1860s,
means race mixing, and has, to twentieth-century minds, embarrassingly bio-
logical connotations; they speak of laws against “interracial” or “cross-cultural”
relationships.  Contemporaries usually referred to “anti-miscegenation” laws.
Neither alternative seems satisfactory, since the first avoids naming the ugli-
ness that was so much a part of the laws and the second implies that “misce-
genation” was a distinct racial phenomenon rather than a categorization im-
posed on certain relationships.  I retain the term miscegenation when speaking
of the laws and court cases that relied on the concept, but not when speaking
of people or particular relationships.
Peggy Pascoe, Miscegenation Law, Court Cases, and Ideologies of “Race” in Twentieth-Century
America, 83 J. AM. HIST. 44, 48 n.11 (1996).
11
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution provides:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State; And the Congress may by Gen-
eral Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings
shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
12
See Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA:  Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Un-
constitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1, 17 (1997) [hereinafter Koppelman, Dumb]; Ralph U.
Whitten, Exporting and Importing Domestic Partnerships:  Some Conflict-of-Laws Questions and
Concerns, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1235, 1246-49 (2001).
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riage,13 and there is a great deal of authority to the contrary, indicat-
ing that states may decline to recognize foreign marriages when those
marriages are contrary to the strong public policy of the forum state.14
Some have also thought that if the union is denominated a “civil
union” or “domestic partnership” rather than a “marriage,” it has a
diminished right to extraterritorial recognition.  This difference of la-
bel changes the analysis in two respects, which tend to cancel one an-
other out.  First, the general policy in favor of recognizing marriages
may be thought to be weaker in this case.  Second, the recent wave of
legislation refusing to recognize same-sex marriages is of doubtful
relevance here, since most of those statutes specifically refuse recogni-
tion only to same-sex marriages.15  Opposition to legal recognition of
same-sex relationships is far weaker than opposition to giving those
relationships the label of marriage.16  So it is unclear whether the re-
13
See Koppelman, Dumb, supra note 12, at 10-15; Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex
Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921, 971 n.183 (1998) [here-
inafter Koppelman, Public Policy].  Both of these articles are reprinted in abridged and
slightly revised form in ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW 94, 127 (2002) [hereinafter KOPPELMAN, GAY RIGHTS].
14
Koppelman, Public Policy, supra note 13, at 946-62; Developments, supra note 9, at
2045.
15
When it passed the Vermont civil unions statute, the Vermont General Assembly
stated that the civil union system “does not bestow the status of civil marriage” on
same-sex couples.  2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 91, § 1(10).  Most of the state constitu-
tional amendments enacted in November 2004 reach civil unions as well, specifically
those of Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, North Dakota, Ohio, and Utah.  Such
laws were adopted by legislatures in Louisiana, Nebraska, West Virginia, and possibly
Florida (the language is ambiguous).  See infra app.
16
For example, a poll in March 2000 found that health insurance for gay partners
was supported by 58% of Americans, and 54% thought (contrary to the federal De-
fense of Marriage Act) that same-sex partners should get Social Security benefits.  John
Leland, Shades of Gay, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 20, 2000, at 46, 49.  An Associated Press poll
two months later produced nearly identical results.  Will Lester, Associated Press, Poll:
Americans Back Some Gay Rights, May 31, 2000, available at 2000 WL 21988231.  The poll
found that “51 percent were opposed to allowing gay couples to marry, while 34 per-
cent approved.”  Id.  On the other hand, “at least half of Americans support[ed] the
rights of gays to receive health insurance (53 percent), Social Security benefits (50
percent) and inheritance (56 percent) from their partners.”  Id.  When people are
asked about giving gay couples all the same legal rights as married couples, the split is
a third in favor, a third against, and a third who do not care.  See Heather Mason,
Gallup Org., How Would Same-Sex Marriages Affect Society? (Nov. 11, 2003), at
www.gallup.com/poll/content/print.aspx?ci=967 (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).  More pre-
cisely, when asked “Do you think gay or lesbian couples should—or should not—be
allowed all the same legal rights as married couples in every state, or does it not matter
to you?” the numbers are 32% “[y]es, should,” 35% “[n]o, should not,” and 32%
“[d]oesn’t matter.”  Id.  The margin of sampling error is three percentage points, so
the differences are statistically insignificant.  Id.  The poll was conducted jointly by
CNN, USA Today, and Gallup in September, 2003.
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cent statutes are or are not an obstacle to full recognition of Vermont
civil unions.  These considerations essentially cancel one another out,
and the analysis goes through in much the same way that it would if
the label “marriage” were used.
We must also disregard the powerful constitutional arguments in
favor of universal recognition of same-sex marriage.  I have argued in
the past,17 and continue to think, that the conflict of laws in this case is
as illusory as the old conflict over the validity of interracial marriages,
since a real conflict requires two valid, arguably applicable laws.  How-
ever, it would be surprising if the federal courts were to impose same-
sex marriage on the entire country, and the strength of the constitu-
tional arguments for doing so does not change that fact.18  The reality
is that there is a choice-of-law issue.  For purposes of this Article, then,
I shall assume what I am confident is not true.19
Because different states have different rules concerning who may
marry, the question of a marriage’s validity may raise an issue of con-
flict of laws—that is to say, an issue in which a court must decide
“whether or not and, if so, in what way, the answer to a legal question
will be affected because the elements of the problem have contacts
with more than one jurisdiction.”20  In conflicts cases, the “overwhelm-
ing tendency”21 is to validate marriages, but the courts have frequently
recited an exception in cases where recognition would violate the
strong public policy of the forum state.22
This area of the law has become somewhat archaic, because the
public policy exception to marriage recognition has been invoked
17
See KOPPELMAN, GAY RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 6-71.
18
Under present circumstances, it would not even be wise for courts to get far
ahead of public opinion on this issue.  See id. at 141-54.
19
This is the price of avoiding irrelevance.  Imagine you were a lawyer in 1910
who disagreed with Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which held that the Fourteenth Amendment permits a law
requiring racial segregation.  In order to be able to participate in conversation with
other lawyers about arguments that had any hope of being adopted in court, you
would have to relax that assumption.  Even if your view of the law were the one that
ultimately would prevail, as in fact it did, that fact would be irrelevant to your immedi-
ate situation.
20
RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1 (3d ed.
1986).
21
WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF
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primarily in three contexts:23  polygamy, incest, and miscegenation.  The
first two were always misnomers to some extent.  No state ever recog-
nized polygamy.24  Nor did any state ever violate “the core instances of
the incest taboo by legalizing parent-child or sibling marriages; the in-
cest cases involved marriages between first cousins, aunts and neph-
ews, uncles and nieces, or even more remote relations.”25
Interracial marriage aroused the strongest passions in the courts,
whose “opinions can be arranged along a discomfort continuum, with
polygamy being the least offensive, incest falling in the middle and
miscegenation giving courts the greatest amount of consternation.”26
In 1967, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional every miscege-
nation prohibition in the country, thereby eliminating any conflict of
laws with respect to that issue.27  Since that time, there has not been
any comparably severe moral conflict among the states with respect to
marriage.  Until now.
Forty states have laws on the books declaring that they will not
recognize foreign same-sex marriages and that such marriages are
contrary to their public policy.28  They present a significant obstacle to
the recognition of same-sex marriages from Massachusetts.  It is less
clear whether most of these laws are even relevant to the recognition
of civil unions from other states since almost all of them use the word
“marriage” to describe what they are denying to same-sex couples.29
Nonetheless, some of them have very strong language, describing
same-sex marriages as “void” or “prohibited.”30  These provisions are
widely understood as enacting a “blanket rule of nonrecognition, un-
der which states would ‘ignore marriage licenses granted to same-sex
23
There have also been cases involving differences in age restrictions and in rules
concerning remarriage after divorce.  See Koppelman, Public Policy, supra note 13, at
941, 947.
24




Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-Sex Marriages Be Recognized in Sister States?:  Full
Faith and Credit and Due Process Limitations on States’ Choice of Law Regarding the Status and
Incidents of Homosexual Marriages Following Hawaii’s Baehr v. Lewin, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J.
FAM. L. 551, 573 (1994).
27
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
28
These laws are collected in the appendix, which updates and supersedes the
compilation in Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage and Public Policy:  The Miscegena-
tion Precedents, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 105 (1996).
29
Only a few of these provisions contemplate civil unions.  See supra note 15.
30
Koppelman, Public Policy, supra note 13, at 965-70.
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couples in other states.’”31  Under the blanket nonrecognition rule, a
state’s courts would never recognize any same-sex union for any pur-
pose whatsoever.  Those who have proposed this rule do not seem to
have understood just how unprecedented a measure they are propos-
ing.
The closest historical analogue to the radical moral disagreement
over same-sex relationships is the divide between those states that
permitted and those that forbade marriage between whites and blacks.
For this reason, the miscegenation cases deserve particularly close ex-
amination.  Miscegenation prohibitions were in force as early as the
1660s, but only after the Civil War did they begin to function as a cen-
tral sanction in the system of white supremacy.  “At one time or an-
other, 41 American colonies and states enacted them . . . .”32
The miscegenation taboo was held in the southern states with
great tenacity; it was close to the psychological core of racism.33
“[A]lthough such marriages were infrequent throughout most of U.S.
history, an enormous amount of time and energy was nonetheless
spent in trying to prevent them from taking place.”34  When they de-
fended the prohibition, southern courts were at least as passionate in
their denunciations as modern opponents of same-sex marriage:
The purity of public morals, the moral and physical development of both
races, and the highest advancement of our cherished southern civiliza-
tion, under which two distinct races are to work out and accomplish the
destiny to which the Almighty has assigned them on this continent—all
require that they should be kept distinct and separate, and that connec-
tions and alliances so unnatural that God and nature seem to forbid
31
Id. at 924.  This formulation appears in two executive orders issued a few days
apart by Governors Fob James, Jr. of Alabama and Kirk Fordice of Mississippi, declar-
ing that they would not recognize same-sex marriages.  Id. at 924 n.7 (citing Ala. Gov.,
Exec. Order No. 24 (Aug. 29, 1996) (declaring that same-sex marriage in another state
“shall not be recognized as a valid marriage, shall produce no civil effects nor confer
any of the benefits, burdens or obligations of marriage”); Miss. Gov., Exec. Order No.
770 (Aug. 22, 1996) (same)).
32
Pascoe, supra note 10, at 49.
33
See generally Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men
Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 220-34 (1994).
34
Peggy Pascoe, Race, Gender, and Intercultural Relations:  The Case of Interracial Mar-
riage, FRONTIERS, 1991 No.1, at 5, 6 (1991).
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them, should be prohibited by positive law, and be subject to no eva-
sion.35
The southern states typically went far beyond the recent legislation
prohibiting same-sex marriage by making interracial marriage a fel-
ony.  And often it was specifically marriage, and not merely interracial
sex, that was criminalized.  In some states, it was necessary to prove
cohabitation in order to convict for miscegenation;36 in others, the
prosecutor was required to prove an actual marriage.37  One convic-
tion was reversed because, although the ceremony had taken place,
the officiating notary’s commission had expired!38
35
Kinney v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 858, 869 (1878).  Similar state-
ments by leading legal authorities are ubiquitous.  See, e.g., Pace v. State, 69 Ala. 231,
232 (1881) (“Its result may be the amalgamation of the two races, producing a mon-
grel population and a degraded civilization, the prevention of which is dictated by a
sound public policy affecting the highest interests of society and government.”), aff’d,
106 U.S. 583 (1883); Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190, 195 (1877) (“And surely there can not
be any tyranny or injustice in requiring both [races] alike[] to form this union with
those of their own race only, whom God hath joined together by indelible peculiari-
ties, which declare that He has made the two races distinct.”); State v. Gibson, 36 Ind.
389, 404 (1871) (“The natural law which forbids their intermarriage and that social
amalgamation which leads to a corruption of races, is as clearly divine as that which
imparted to them different natures.” (quoting W. Chester & Phila. R.R. v. Miles, 55 Pa.
209, 213 (1867))); Pennegar v. State, 10 S.W. 305, 307 (Tenn. 1889) (referring to “the
very pronounced convictions of the people of this state as to the demoralization and
debauchery involved in such alliances”); Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955)
(arguing that the state’s legitimate purposes in prohibiting miscegenation are “to pre-
serve the racial integrity of its citizens,” to prevent “the corruption of blood” or crea-
tion of “a mongrel breed of citizens,” and “the obliteration of racial pride”); W.C.
RODGERS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 74, at 49 (1899) (de-
scribing the purpose of miscegenation laws as “to keep pure and unmixed the blood of
the two races, to the end that the paramount excellence of the one may not be lowered
by an admixture with the other”).
36
For cases reversing convictions on this basis, see Gilbert v. State, 23 So. 2d 22
(Ala. Ct. App. 1945); Jackson v. State, 129 So. 306 (Ala. Ct. App. 1930); Metcalf v. State,
78 So. 305 (Ala. Ct. App. 1918); Hardin v. State, 339 S.W.2d 423 (Ark. 1960); Poland v.
State, 339 S.W.2d 421 (Ark. 1960); Wilson v. State, 13 S.W.2d 24 (Ark. 1929); Hovis v.
State, 257 S.W. 363 (Ark. 1924); Wildman v. State, 25 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1946).  A convic-
tion was affirmed, on evidence that the couple had lived together for many years, in
Parramore v. State, 88 So. 472 (Fla. 1921).  See also State v. Brown, 108 So. 2d 233, 235
(La. 1959) (describing the statute that prohibits “customary or repeated acts of sexual
intercourse, and not merely an isolated case of intercourse”).
37
See Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877) (upholding an interracial marriage con-
viction); Moore v. State, 7 Tex. Ct. App. 608, 609 (1880) (“[T]he fact of marriage is an
essential ingredient, and must be positively averred and proved.  A mere cohabitation
within this State, without a previous intermarriage, does not bring the offence within
the statute.” (internal citation omitted)); Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. Ct. App. 263, 280
(1877) (stating that the marriage certificate was properly admitted in evidence).
38
Williams v. State, 125 So. 690, 692 (Ala. Ct. App. 1930).
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Today, on the other hand, even the states most strongly opposed
to same-sex marriage have never attempted to make it a crime to enter
into such marriages.  Moreover, even before laws against consensual
sodomy were invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court,39 they were al-
most never enforced.  It would be hard to argue that the southern
states’ public policy against miscegenation was less strong than mod-
ern public policies against same-sex marriage.
Yet even in this charged context, the southern states did not make
a blunderbuss of their own public policy.  Their decisions concerning
the validity of interracial marriages were surprisingly fact-dependent.
They did not utterly disregard the interests of the parties to the for-
bidden marriages or of the states that had recognized their marriages,
but weighed these against the countervailing interests of the forum.
Where those forum interests were attenuated, southern courts some-
times upheld marriages between blacks and whites.
These cases are the most useful precedent for assessing the extra-
territorial validity of same-sex marriages because they deal with the
same problem we face today:  a deep moral disagreement about the
value of a certain kind of marriage, reflected in widely varying state
laws.  If we suspend, for the sake of argument, our objections to the
substantive laws in question, we may find a certain wisdom in their
rules.  The Jim Crow judges were horrifyingly wrong about many
things, but they did understand the problem of moral pluralism in a
federal system, and we can learn something important from the solu-
tions that they devised.
II.  FOUR TYPES OF MARRIAGE CASES
The authorities on interracial marriage consider four different
categories of situations in which the recognition question might arise.
A.  Evasive Marriages
The first category, “evasive” marriages, consists of cases in which
parties have traveled out of their home state for the express purpose
of evading that state’s prohibition of their marriages and thereafter
immediately returned home.  Such marriages will be considered inva-
lid if they violate the strong public policy of the couple’s home state.
39
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art7
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The law with respect to evasive marriages is quite clear.  “States
ha[ve the] right to govern their own residents.”40  In the interracial
marriage cases, these marriages were almost never recognized.41  This
antievasion principle was applied, however, only in cases where the
parties were domiciliaries of the forum at the time of marriage.42
Discerning public policy will be easy in the forty states that have
legislation on the books, enacted after 1992, declaring that same-sex
marriages are void or prohibited.  In the other states, the outcome will
be uncertain.  The public policy doctrine is an anomaly in the conflict
of laws and is rarely invoked.  Absent a statute, it is not clear how a
public policy could be shown.  It is clear that a mere difference be-
tween forum law and foreign law is not sufficient; if it were, then there
could never be any conflicts analysis, because forum law would always
be applied.43  The answer depends on a close reading of state law
sources.  One source that might have once been helpful is the exis-
tence of a state sodomy law, but all such laws have now been declared
unconstitutional and void.44
B.  Migratory Marriages
The second category, “migratory” marriages, consists of cases in
which the parties had not intended to evade the laws of any state when
they married, but contracted marriages valid where they lived, and
subsequently moved to states where their marriages were prohibited.
An example would be a same-sex couple who were residents of Massa-
chusetts when they married, and who later moved to Pennsylvania.
These are hard cases, and it is not clear how they ought to be ad-
dressed.  It is clear that, absent a statutory ban on same-sex marriage,
the state’s public policy will not be strong enough to justify withhold-
ing recognition.  Even if there is such a statute, the state’s interest may
not be strong enough to outweigh the couple’s interest in the con-
tinuing validity of their marriage.
The prevailing position in American law is that the mere fact of
migration cannot void an originally valid marriage.  Most states follow
40
Koppelman, Public Policy, supra note 13, at 953.
41
See id. at 952-54.
42
Where the parties had different domiciles with different policies at the time of
celebration, authority was “sparse” and the commentators were divided.  See Rebecca
Bailey-Harris, Madame Butterfly and the Conflict of Laws, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 157, 175
(1991).
43
See Koppelman, Public Policy, supra note 13, at 934-37.
44
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
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either the First or the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws.45  The First
Restatement holds that a marriage, “which is against the law of the state
of domicil of either party, though the requirements of the law of the
state of celebration have been complied with, will be invalid every-
where” in cases of polygamy, incest as defined by the domicile, “mar-
riage between persons of different races where such marriages are at
the domicil regarded as odious,” or other marriages governed by eva-
sion statutes.46  The Second Restatement made this rule less stringent,
providing that, in order for another state to void a marriage, that state
must have a “strong public policy” against the marriage and “the most
significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of
the marriage.”47
The interracial marriage cases are, however, less clear on this
question.  The difficulty with recognition in those cases was, of course,
that it meant that the “Southern states would have to tolerate some in-
terracial cohabitation within their borders after all.”48  Only two cases
arose in which an interracial couple’s out-of-state marriage was chal-
lenged when they moved to the forum state, and these cases reached
opposite results.49
45
See Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution:  An Empirical Study, 49 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 357, 373 (1992).  Borchers’s study focuses on torts, which is the area in
which most conflicts litigation occurs.  Id. at 369.  There is little recent authority on the
marriage question, but the general approach of these states provides some guidance.
Borchers finds that fifteen states follow the First Restatement, twenty-four follow the
Second Restatement, and the rest follow other approaches or are difficult to classify.
Id. at 373-74.
46
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 132 (1934).  The language relat-
ing to interracial marriage is, of course, obsolete.
47
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971).  “A marriage
which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted will
everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy of another
state which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at
the time of the marriage.”  Id.
48
Koppelman, Public Policy, supra note 13, at 955.
49
See id. at 956-59 (discussing State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242 (1877), in which a North
Carolina court recognized an interracial South Carolina marriage, and State v. Bell, 66
Tenn. 9 (1872), in which a Tennessee court refused to recognize an interracial Missis-
sippi marriage).  Additionally, there were two relevant statutes, also reaching opposite
results, but ambiguities in the language of each make it uncertain whether they even
applied to the question of changed domicile.  See id. at 955-56 (contrasting a 1906 Lou-
isiana statute exempting interracial couples from criminal prosecution if “the par-
ties . . . acquired a domicile” in the state where they were married, with the 1879 Texas
Penal Code, which punished interracial couples regardless of where they were mar-
ried).
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The basic problem presented when states disagree radically about
the proper scope of marriage is that the choice of law involves a ten-
sion between two strong sets of demands, which the courts typically
attempt to balance.  First, states want to determine for themselves
what the precise contours of their marriage laws are to be.  The im-
portance of this interest has become attenuated in recent years, but
the same-sex marriage issue has shown that many states—indeed,
every state legislature that has spoken on this issue—still take it very
seriously.  States’ interests in regulating the marital relationships of
their own domiciliaries does not always weigh against same-sex mar-
riage, of course.  It is as important for Massachusetts to be able to say
that its citizens can enter into same-sex marriages as it is for Utah to be
able to say that its citizens cannot do so.
Second, individuals want to be certain of their status.  “Because
marriage is a long continuing relationship, there normally is a need
that its existence be subject to regulation by one law without occasion
for repeated redetermination of the validity.”50  This interest is far
more pronounced now than it was at the time of the miscegenation
cases because the country is far more mobile than it once was.  With
the advent of the automobile and the airplane, many people cross
state lines every day, often on their way to and from their jobs.  It
would be ridiculous to have people’s marital status blink on and off
like a strobe light as they jet across the country.
How should courts balance these interests?  In recent years, as we
have seen, the “overwhelming tendency”51 has been toward recogni-
tion, and courts addressing marriage recognition questions “typically
are more concerned with personal than with governmental inter-
ests.”52  This, however, is probably at least in part an artifact of the di-
minishing importance of the public policies involved.  Some states
have statutes voiding marriages of domiciliaries who marry elsewhere
in order to avoid the forum’s restrictions, but these statutes say noth-
ing about the marriages of nondomiciliaries and immigrants into the
forum.
A rule that same-sex marriages are void the moment one of the
parties changes her domicile would have absurd results.  The fullest
consideration of this problem appears in Baindail v. Baindail,53 an Eng-
50
EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER F. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 432 (2d ed. 1992).
51




[1946] P. 122, [1946] 1 All E.R. 342 (Eng. C.A.).
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lish case in which an English woman discovered that her husband had
previously contracted a Hindu marriage in India—“a fact in his per-
sonal history,” the court dryly noted, “which he did not think it neces-
sary to reveal.”54  When she sought to annul the marriage, he cited
several cases that seemed to indicate that potentially polygamous mar-
riages were not regarded as marriages at all by English law and argued
that he was therefore legally a single man at the time of his English
marriage.55  The court conceded that this was “a question which is not
covered by authority”56 but found conclusive the prospect that, if it
adopted the husband’s argument, “this English lady would find herself
compelled in India [should he choose to return there] either to leave
her husband or to share him with his Indian wife.”57  Under these cir-
cumstances, “effect must be given to common sense and decency.”58
The annulment was granted.  Baindail was one of the cases that began
the erosion of Britain’s blanket rule of nonrecognition for potentially
polygamous marriages—an erosion that is now complete.59
The Baindail case shows the absurdity of a rule that an otherwise
valid existing marriage can wink out of existence when a party enters a
state (and wink back into existence when he leaves?).60  The conse-
quence would be multiple marriages, and enormous uncertainty
about spousal rights and inheritance.61
54










See Koppelman, Public Policy, supra note 13, at 994-96.
60
For further discussion of the absurdity of such a rule, see Andrew Koppelman,
Against Blanket Interstate Nonrecognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
(forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 5-6).  Such a rule would mean, among other
things, that other states would become havens for avoiding obligations validly entered
into pursuant to Massachusetts law.  See Joseph William Singer, Same Sex Marriage, Full
Faith and Credit, and the Evasion of Obligation, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. (forthcoming 2005)
(manuscript at 6).  In evasion cases, these difficulties are avoided by the rule that such
marriages are void from their inception.  That solution is obviously not available in mi-
gratory cases.
61
Joseph Story’s warnings about the dangers of withholding recognition from for-
eign marriages are, in this context, difficult to improve upon:
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A more sensible approach would hold that such marriages remain
valid but that the law of the new domicile may determine which inci-
dents of the marriage may be enjoyed in that domicile.  Scoles and
Hay observe that “the significance of the status [of marriage] and its
relevance arises in conflict of laws litigation almost exclusively con-
cerning questions regarding the incidents of marriage, such as succes-
sion or claim to property, or a claim for support, or a claim for dam-
ages in tort.”62  Moreover, “in recent choice of law cases, the courts
have begun to recognize that the enjoyment of different incidents of
marriage involves different policies.”63
The earlier migratory cases that took a hard line against recogni-
tion appear to have followed this approach.  Herbert Goodrich, writ-
ing in 1927, explained that “[c]ertain incidents of the marriage rela-
tionship may be refused recognition if they involve a violation of
public policy or good morals of the law of the forum.”64  On this ac-
count, even the couple that was imprisoned remained married; they
Infinite mischief and confusion must necessarily arise to the subjects of all na-
tions with respect to legitimacy, successions, and other rights, if the respective
laws of different countries were only to be observed, as to marriages con-
tracted by the subjects of those countries abroad; and therefore all nations
have consented, or are presumed to consent, for the common benefit and ad-
vantage, that such marriages shall be good or not, according to the laws of the
country where they are celebrated.  By observing this rule few, if any, incon-
veniences can arise.  By disregarding it infinite mischiefs must ensue.  Sup-
pose, for instance, a marriage celebrated in France, according to the law of
that country, should be held void in England, what would be the conse-
quences[?]  Each party might marry anew in the other country.  In one coun-
try the issue would be deemed legitimate; in the other illegitimate.  The
French wife would in France be held the only wife, and entitled as such to all
the rights of property appertaining to that relation.  In England, the English
wife would hold the same exclusive rights and character.  What, then, would
be the confusion in regard to the personal property of the parties, in its own
nature transitory, passing alternately from one country to the other!  Suppose
there should be issue of both marriages, and then all the parties should be-
come domiciled in England or France, what confusion of rights, what embar-
rassments of personal and conjugal relations must necessarily be created!
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 121, at 112-13 (Boston,
Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1834) (footnote omitted).
62




HERBERT F. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 115, at 266
(1927); see also Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 218 n.10 (1933) (Stone, J.,
dissenting) (interpreting a migratory miscegenation case as holding that “[w]ithout
denying the validity of a marriage in another state, the privileges flowing from mar-
riage may be subject to the local law”).
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
2158 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 2143
simply were not permitted the incident of cohabitation in certain
states.65
How can one determine whether any particular incident is avail-
able in a state with a strong public policy, stated in its statutes, against
same-sex marriage?66  A sensible approach would be to distinguish be-
tween those incidents that can be conferred by contract, such as those
pertaining to inheritance or to making medical decisions for one’s
partner, from those that can only be conferred by operation of law,
such as the right to file a joint tax return or the right to a homestead
exemption.67  If a given right is one that the parties could have
achieved under private contract under the forum’s law, then the fo-
rum cannot coherently be said to have a public policy against them
enjoying that incident.  One conflicts rule is particularly relevant here:
no fundamental public policy is involved when states have different
formalities regarding the formation of a contract, such as different
approaches to Statute of Frauds questions.68  If a foreign same-sex
marriage simply provides, under a different formal procedure, rights
65
A similar interpretation can be offered for State v. Brown, 23 N.E. 747 (Ohio
1890), in which a man was prosecuted for intercourse with his niece, whom he had
married in another state where they were then domiciled.  Id. at 749-50.  The court
held:
[W]e are not bound, upon principles of comity, to permit persons to violate
our criminal laws, adopted in the interest of decency and good morals, and
based on principles of sound public policy, because they have assumed, in an-
other state or country where it was lawful, the relation which led to the acts
prohibited by our laws.
Id. at 750.  The last part of the quoted sentence appears to concede that the couple has
assumed the relation of man and wife; presumably, neither would have been permitted
to come to Ohio alone and there marry someone else.  Nonetheless, their kinship
status meant that they could not lawfully engage in sexual intercourse within the bor-
ders of Ohio.
66
In earlier writings, I regarded this question as a deeply uncertain one.  See
KOPPELMAN, GAY RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 122-25; Koppelman, Public Policy, supra note
13, at 984-88.  Here I revise my position.
67
One peculiarity of applying the incidents approach in the marriage context is
that the incident of marriage that was most important in the earlier cases was the right
to sexual intercourse.  The central public policy of miscegenation law was the urgent
imperative of keeping black penises out of white vaginas.  Any state purpose of pre-
venting sexual conduct is now mooted by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
68
See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 50, at 669.
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that might have been conferred by forum law, then there is no public
policy against enforcing those rights.69
There is, however, one set of rights that cannot be conferred by
contract, but that should remain undisturbed if the couple migrates
into the forum.70  As a general matter, if rights of third parties, created
by the operation of state law, are involved, those third-party rights
should not be annulled by the unilateral decision to move.  Most im-
portantly, parent-child relationships should not be annulled in this
way.  If a same-sex couple, or one member of the couple, migrates to a
state that does not recognize same-sex marriage, and there is a child
or children to whom the pertinent adult has parental rights and obli-
gations, those rights and obligations should persist even after migra-
tion.  A different rule would implicate the constitutional rights of the
children, who can reasonably claim that they have a constitutional
right to their relationships with their parents.71
C.  Visitor Marriages
The third category is “visitor” marriages, which consists of cases
where couples are temporarily visiting states that do not recognize
their marriages.  This is the type of case that most urgently demands
clarity because it will arise more frequently than any of the others.  In
the modern United States, nearly everyone sometimes travels across
state lines, and the proportion is probably even higher in states as
small as Massachusetts and Vermont.  Though there is little authority
that addresses this precise question, such marriages should always be
recognized.
69
Thus, for example, if a Massachusetts couple moves to Illinois, and one spouse
dies and leaves no inheritance to the other, the Illinois courts should give the survivor
the amount of the elective share that a surviving spouse is entitled to under Illinois law.
See 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-8 (West 1992).  Two unrelated persons can enter
into a contract whereby one promises to leave a bequest to the other, and if supported
by consideration, courts enforce such contracts by awarding “the value of the property
which was to come to the promisee.”  THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF WILLS § 48, at 218 (2d ed. 1953); see also Doney v. Koehler (In re Estate of Fritz), 406
N.W.2d 475, 478-79 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).  Thanks to my colleague Robert Sitkoff for
this example.
70
Another is rights of inheritance, which are only asserted when one party dies
and the marriage is over.  In such cases, the couple is not attempting to continue to
live as a recognized entity within the state, and so the state’s interest in refusing recog-
nition is attenuated.  See In re May’s Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4, 5 (N.Y. 1953); Langan v. St.
Vincent’s Hosp., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411, 422 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
71
See Seth Kreimer, Territoriality and Moral Dissensus:  Thoughts on Abortion, Slavery,
Gay Marriage and Family Values, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 161, 182-89 (1996).
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It is in these cases that a blanket rule of nonrecognition would
have the harshest consequences.  Consider the position of a same-sex
couple who make their home in Massachusetts.  They do not seek to
evade any other state’s laws.  They simply have done what their own
state’s laws authorize them to do.  What is their status to be within the
federal system?
The blanket nonrecognition rule would place such a couple in a
difficult position.  They would lose all the rights arising out of their
marriage as soon as they crossed the border into any state that had
such a rule.  Moreover, even if they never left home, they would be
treated as unmarried if their status should become relevant to litiga-
tion that takes place in another state.
The consequences would be nastier than any proponent of non-
recognition probably contemplated.  To begin with the most extreme
case:  suppose a lesbian couple is married and raising a child together
in California, and that the child’s biological mother takes the child on
a weekend trip to another state.72  While there, the mother and child
are both seriously injured in an automobile accident.  As soon as the
other spouse learns the news, she gets onto an airplane and soon ar-
rives at the hospital.  Under the blanket nonrecognition rule, this is
what she would be told:
You may not visit either of these patients because only family mem-
bers may visit patients here, and you are not a family member of either
of these people in any respect which our state recognizes.  You may not
participate in medical decisions for either of them.  If the mother dies,
you will not have any parental rights in the child.  If there is no surviving
biological relative, we will regard the child as an orphan and place him
in foster care.
72
Vermont and California, in nearly identical language, provide that the child of
either party to a civil union shall be regarded as the child of both.  California law
states:
The rights and obligations of registered domestic partners with respect to a
child of either of them shall be the same as those of spouses.  The rights and
obligations of former or surviving registered domestic partners with respect to
a child of either of them shall be the same as those of former or surviving
spouses.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(d) (West 2004).  Vermont law states:
The rights of parties to a civil union, with respect to a child of whom either
becomes the natural parent during the term of the civil union, shall be the
same as those of a married couple, with respect to a child of whom either
spouse becomes the natural parent during the marriage.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(f) (2002).  An obvious consequence is that, in order for
the spouse of the biological mother to assert parental rights in a legal proceeding, he
or she must plead the existence of the civil union.
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None of the various approaches to conflict of laws that are followed in
the United States requires this result, although each is uncertain
enough that it cannot be foreclosed.73  All one can say is that no other
type of marriage in American history has been treated so badly.
The only authority on this question that I have been able to find
arises in dictum in an 1879 marriage evasion case, Ex parte Kinney,74 in
which a man convicted of miscegenation sought a writ of habeas cor-
pus in federal court, alleging that his federal rights had been violated.
Kinney is the only miscegenation case that contains any discussion of
constitutional limitations deriving from federalism (rather than from
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
The defendant and his partner had traveled from Virginia to the
District of Columbia, married there, and then returned to Virginia,
where they were convicted of miscegenation and each sentenced to
five years in prison at hard labor.  Kinney claimed “that a marriage
lawful in the District of Columbia is lawful everywhere in the United
States, enabling those so married to live together as man and wife in
any part of the United States, and that any state law forbidding them
to do so is contrary to the constitution and void.”75  The court rejected
the claim, holding that the marriage was a fraud on the laws of Vir-
ginia.  It took a hard line on the question of migratory marriages, de-
claring that Kinney’s claim would be rejected even in a closer case, in-
volving “citizens of another state, lawfully married in that domicile,
afterward migrating thence in good faith into this state.”76  The Con-
stitution would not forbid criminal prosecution even then, because
“‘special privileges enjoyed by citizens in their own states are not se-
cured to them in other states.’”77  The right of interracial marriage is
“a right legally enjoyed in the District but not given here.”78
But the Kinney court went on to declare that Virginia could not
enforce its law against nondomiciliaries nor exclude altogether inter-
racial couples domiciled in the District of Columbia.  “That such a
73
See generally Whitten, supra note 12.  Unfortunately, one court has already man-
aged to reach this result, holding that, because Virginia does not recognize same-sex
relationships, a parental tie recognized in Vermont can be severed by the other parent
unilaterally transporting the child to Virginia.  The case is on appeal.  See Christina
Nuckols, Two Women, Two States, One Child, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Dec. 13, 2004, at A1.
74






Id. (quoting Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868), overruled in part
by United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944)).
78
Id.
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citizen would have a right of transit with his wife through Virginia, and
of temporary stoppage, and of carrying on any business here not re-
quiring residence, may be conceded, because these are privileges fol-
lowing a citizen of the United States . . . .”79  The reference to “tempo-
rary stoppage” clearly implies that Virginia might have to tolerate
within its borders sexual intercourse between a black man and a white
woman.
The reasoning of Kinney is a fairly straightforward application of
principles of federalism.  It is well settled that there is a constitutional
right to travel.  “We are all citizens of the United States, and as mem-
bers of the same community must have the right to pass and repass
through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own
States.”80  On this basis, the Court invalidated a one dollar tax on per-
sons who wanted to leave a state.  If this is impermissible, then a forti-
ori the right to travel precludes the much heavier burden of dissolving
one’s closest family relations as the price of interstate travel.  The
marriages of visitors should be recognized for all purposes, regardless
of the public policy of the forum state.
In practice, the analysis will not often differ from that in the mi-
gratory cases because most of the rights of marriage that cannot be
conferred by contract can only be asserted in the state of one’s domi-
cile:  the right to file a joint tax return, for example.  An important
exception is the right to file a wrongful death suit.  Suppose that a
person from Massachusetts is killed by a drunk driver in Illinois and
seeks to file a suit for wrongful death.  What result?
Actions for wrongful death are brought by the decedent’s estate,
but the wrongful death statutes typically designate certain family
members who can recover and preclude recovery by those who fall
outside the named group.81  The viability of a suit will thus sometimes
depend on whether the decedent’s marriage to a person of the same
sex is recognized by the forum.  Under these circumstances, the mar-
riage should be recognized.
D.  Extraterritorial Marriages
Finally, the fourth category consists of “extraterritorial” cases in




Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1868).
81
See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 127,
at 947-49 (5th ed. 1984).
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marriages are relevant to litigation conducted there.  For example, af-
ter the death intestate of one spouse, the other may seek to inherit
property that was located within the forum state.
On this question the case law is unanimous.  The marriages were
routinely upheld on the reasoning that, the purpose of the law being
the prevention of interracial cohabitation within the forum, no harm
would be done by recognizing the marriage after its dissolution by
death for purposes of allowing the survivor to inherit the decedent’s
property in the state or allowing the children to inherit as legitimate
offspring.  All deemed it dispositive that their states’ laws were not in-
tended to have any extraterritorial application.  Typical was the pro-
nouncement of the Mississippi Supreme Court in 1948:
The manifest and recognized purpose of this statute was to prevent per-
sons of Negro and white blood from living together in this state in the
relationship of husband and wife.  Where, as here, this did not occur, to
permit one of the parties to such a marriage to inherit property in this
state from the other does no violence to the purpose of [the miscegena-
tion laws].  What we are requested to do is simply to recognize this mar-
riage to the extent only of permitting one of the parties thereto to in-
herit from the other property in Mississippi, and to that extent it must
and will be recognized.
82
The current wave of anti-same-sex-marriage statutes is not un-
precedented.  Similar wording was ubiquitous in the miscegenation
statutes, which usually declared interracial marriages “void.”83  The
cases I have just described, which held that the miscegenation laws did
not reach extraterritorial marriages not involving cohabitation in the
state, all involved statutes using this term.84  Even if it is assumed that
the new laws prohibit recognition of civil unions, they should not be
understood to go farther than the miscegenation laws.  If words such
as “void” did not mandate blanket recognition in the miscegenation
cases, it should not do so in the same-sex marriage cases either.
82
Miller v. Lucks, 36 So. 2d 140, 142 (Miss. 1948).
83
See 1 CHESTER G. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 204-09 (1931) (compiling
statutes).  For earlier surveys to the same effect, see 1 FREDERIC J. STIMSON, AMERICAN
STATUTE LAW § 6112-13, at 667-69 (Boston, Charles C. Soule 1886); Note, Intermarriage
with Negroes—A Survey of State Statutes, 36 YALE L.J. 858, 863 (1927).
84
See Whittington v. McCaskill, 61 So. 236 (Fla. 1913) (noting that the state consti-
tution declared interracial marriages “forever prohibited” and statute deemed them
“utterly null and void”); Succession of Caballero (Mrs. Conte) v. Executor, 24 La. Ann.
573, 582 (1872) (Wyly, J., dissenting) (discussing LA. CIV. CODE art. 95 (1825)
(amended 1894), which declared interracial marriages “forbidden,” “void,” and a “nul-
lity”); Miller, 36 So. 2d at 141 (noting that the state constitution declared such mar-
riages “unlawful and void”).
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CONCLUSION
Thus far, there is little case law on recognition of foreign civil un-
ions, and all of the cases involve evasive marriages.  A New York court
found that the surviving spouse in a Vermont civil union could bring a
wrongful death action.85  A Georgia court declined to recognize a
Vermont civil union in a case in which both parties were Georgia
domiciliaries, though the court did not notice the significance of
domicile.86  A Connecticut court construed Connecticut law to deny it
subject matter jurisdiction to dissolve a Vermont civil union entered
into by a Connecticut domiciliary.87  The last two of these cases in-
cluded language that suggested a blanket rule of nonrecognition, but
they did so unreflectively, without noticing the practical or constitu-
tional difficulties that such a rule would entail.  An Iowa judge ap-
proved an uncontested divorce between two lesbians who had been in
a Vermont civil union.88  The question of migratory, visitor, or extra-
territorial marriages has not yet arisen.
The cases that are likely to be most troublesome for states that dis-
favor same-sex marriage will involve visitor marriages, since they have
the strongest claim to recognition for all purposes.  The constitutional
and other legal arguments for recognition have already been dis-
cussed.  Those with moral objections to homosexual conduct may also
want to contemplate one other consideration.  The Sodom story in
the book of Genesis89 is often taken to be a categorical condemnation
of homosexual conduct, but it is equally a condemnation of inhospi-
tality toward visitors.  States that are transfixed by one danger should
not thoughtlessly fall into the other.
85
Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411, 416-17 (Sup. Ct. 2003).
86
Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47, 49 (Ga. App. Ct. 2002).
87
Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, 174-75 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
88
Frank Santiago, Iowa Judge OKs Lesbian Divorce, DES MOINES REG., Dec. 12, 2003,
at 1A, available at 2003 WLNR 12869636.
89
See Genesis 19:1-8; Judges 19:16-30.  For an overview of contending interpreta-
tions, see THOMAS E. SCHMIDT, STRAIGHT & NARROW?:  COMPASSION & CLARITY IN THE
HOMOSEXUALITY DEBATE 30-32, 86-89 (1995).
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APPENDIX:  STATE ANTI-SAME-SEX-MARRIAGE STATUTES
The following is a compilation of all the state statutes barring
same-sex marriage that are now on the books in the United States.
They fall into two categories.  The largest group is the mini-DOMAs,
laws barring recognition of same-sex marriage that were passed subse-
quent and in reaction to the 1993 Hawaii Supreme Court decision
that indicated that the denial of marriage to same-sex couples would
be subject to strict scrutiny.90  There are forty states with mini-DOMAs:
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and West
Virginia.  Five of these, Florida, Georgia, Ohio, Texas, and West Vir-
ginia, indicate that they will not even recognize “judicial proceedings”
arising from same-sex marriage.  Most of these laws apply only to for-
eign marriages, but those of Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Utah, and Virginia, bar
recognition of relationships similar to marriage as well, evidently
meaning marriage-like statuses such as California domestic partner-
ships and Connecticut and Vermont civil unions.  Three states have
pre-1993 statutes barring same-sex marriage:  Maryland (1973), New
Hampshire (1987), and Wyoming (1977).  Connecticut does not di-
rectly address the issue, but its adoption law declares that the state’s
public policy limits marriage to a man and a woman.  Same-sex mar-
riages are recognized, and licenses continue to be issued, in Massa-
chusetts.  There is no authority on the question in five states:  New Jer-
sey, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin.
90
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993).
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ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (2004). Alabama Marriage Protection Act; mar-
riage defined; marriage between individuals of same sex invalid.
(a) This section shall be known and may be cited as the “Alabama
Marriage Protection Act.”
(b) Marriage is inherently a unique relationship between a man
and a woman.  As a matter of public policy, this state has a special in-
terest in encouraging, supporting, and protecting the unique relation-
ship in order to promote, among other goals, the stability and welfare
of society and its children.  A marriage contracted between individuals
of the same sex is invalid in this state.
(c) Marriage is a sacred covenant, solemnized between a man and
a woman, which, when the legal capacity and consent of both parties
is present, establishes their relationship as husband and wife, and
which is recognized by the state as a civil contract.
(d) No marriage license shall be issued in the State of Alabama to
parties of the same sex.
(e) The State of Alabama shall not recognize as valid any marriage
of parties of the same sex that occurred or was alleged to have oc-
curred as a result of the law of any jurisdiction regardless of whether a
marriage license was issued.
Passed 1998.
ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 25.  Marriage.
To be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist only
between one man and one woman.
Effective 1999.
ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (Michie 2004).   Same-sex marriages.
(a) A marriage entered into by persons of the same sex, either
under common law or under statute, that is recognized by another
state or foreign jurisdiction is void in this state, and contractual rights
granted by virtue of the marriage, including its termination, are unen-
forceable in this state.
(b) A same-sex relationship may not be recognized by the state as
being entitled to the benefits of marriage.
Effective 1996.
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ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101 (West 2000).  Void and prohibited
marriages.
C. Marriage between persons of the same sex is void and prohib-
ited.
Amended 1996.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-112 (West 2000).  Marriages contracted in
another state; validity and effect.
A. Marriages valid by the laws of the place where contracted are
valid in this state, except marriages that are void and prohibited by §
25-101.
B. Marriages solemnized in another state or country by parties in-
tending at the time to reside in this state shall have the same legal
consequences and effect as if solemnized in this state, except mar-
riages that are void and prohibited by § 25-101.
C. Parties residing in this state may not evade the laws of this state
relating to marriage by going to another state or country for solemni-
zation of the marriage.
Amended 1996.
ARK. CONST.91
SECTION 1:  Marriage
Marriage consists only of the union of one man and one woman.
SECTION 2:  Marital Status
Legal status for unmarried persons which is identical or substan-
tially similar to marital status shall not be valid or recognized in Ar-
kansas, except that the Legislature may recognize a common law mar-
riage from another state between a man and a woman.
SECTION 3:  Capacity, rights, obligations, privileges, and immunities.
The Legislature has the power to determine the capacity of per-
sons to marry, subject to this amendment, and the legal rights, obliga-
tion, privileges, and immunities of marriage.
Passed 2004 by ballot measure.
91
This provision has not yet been assigned a specific citation.  See Arkansas Ballot
Measure No. 4 (2004).
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ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-208 (Michie 2002).  License not issued to per-
sons under age or to persons of the same sex.
(a) No license shall be issued to persons to marry unless and until
the female shall attain the age of sixteen (16) years and the male the
age of seventeen (17) years and then only by written consent by a par-
ent or guardian until the male shall have attained the age of eighteen
(18) years and the female the age of eighteen (18) years.
(b) It shall be the declared public policy of the State of Arkansas
to recognize the marital union only of man and woman.  No license
shall be issued to persons to marry another person of the same sex
and no same-sex marriage shall be recognized as entitled to the bene-
fits of marriage.
(c) Marriages between persons of the same sex are prohibited in
this state.  Any marriage entered into by persons of the same sex,
where a marriage license is issued by another state or by a foreign ju-
risdiction, shall be void in Arkansas and any contractual or other
rights granted by virtue of that license, including its termination, shall
be unenforceable in the Arkansas courts.
(d) However, nothing in this section shall prevent an employer
from extending benefits to persons who are domestic partners of em-
ployees.
Amended 1997.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-107 (Michie 2002).  Validity of foreign mar-
riages.
(a) All marriages contracted outside this state which would be
valid by the laws of the state or country in which the marriages were
consummated and in which the parties then actually resided shall be
valid in all the courts in this state.
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ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-109 (Michie 2002).  Validity of same-sex mar-
riages.
Marriage shall be only between a man and a woman.  A marriage
between persons of the same sex is void.
Amended 1997.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 299.2 (West 2004).  Recognizing same sex unions
from another jurisdiction as a valid domestic partnership.
A legal union of two persons of the same sex, other than a mar-
riage, that was validly formed in another jurisdiction, and that is sub-
stantially equivalent to a domestic partnership as defined in this part,
shall be recognized as a valid domestic partnership in this state re-
gardless of whether it bears the name domestic partnership.
Passed 2003.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West 2004).  Between man and woman only.
Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized
in California.
Passed 2000 by initiative measure.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104 (2003).  Formalities.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) of this section,
a marriage is valid in this state if:
(a) It is licensed, solemnized, and registered as provided in this
part 1; and
(b) It is only between one man and one woman.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14-2-112, any mar-
riage contracted within or outside this state that does not satisfy para-
graph (b) of subsection (1) of this section shall not be recognized as
valid in this state.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to repeal or render
invalid any otherwise valid common law marriage between one man
and one woman.
Amended 2000.
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CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81r (West 2004).  Sexual orientation
discrimination:  Construction of statutes.
Nothing in sections 4a-60a, 45a-726a, 46a-51, 46a-54, 46a-56, 46a-
63, 46a-64b, 46a-65, 46a-67, 46a-68b, and 46a-81a to 46a-81q, inclusive,
subsection (d) of section 46a-82, subsection (a) of section 46a-83, and
sections 46a-86, 46a-89, 46a-90a, 46a-98, 46a-98a and 46a-99 [the laws
protecting gays from discrimination] shall be deemed or construed
(1) to mean the state of Connecticut condones homosexuality or bi-
sexuality or any equivalent lifestyle, (2) to authorize the promotion of
homosexuality or bisexuality in educational institutions or require the
teaching in educational institutions of homosexuality or bisexuality as
an acceptable lifestyle, (3) to authorize or permit the use of numerical
goals or quotas, or other types of affirmative action programs, with re-
spect to homosexuality or bisexuality in the administration or en-
forcement of the provisions of sections 4a-60a, 45a-726a, 46a-51, 46a-
54, 46a-56, 46a-63, 46a-64b, 46a-65, 46a-67, 46a-68b, and 46a-81a to
46a-81q, inclusive, subsection (d) of section 46a-82, subsection (a) of
section 46a-83, and sections 46a-86, 46a-89, 46a-90a, 46a-98, 46a-98a
and 46a-99, (4) to authorize the recognition of or the right of mar-
riage between persons of the same sex, or (5) to establish sexual ori-
entation as a specific and separate cultural classification in society.
Passed 1991.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-727a (West 2004).  State policy re best
interests of child; public policy re marriage.
The General Assembly finds that:
(1) The best interests of a child are promoted by having persons
in the child’s life who manifest a deep concern for the child’s growth
and development;
(2) The best interests of a child are promoted when a child has as
many persons loving and caring for the child as possible;
(3) The best interests of a child are promoted when the child is
part of a loving, supportive and stable family, whether that family is a
nuclear, extended, split, blended, single parent, adoptive or foster
family; and
(4) It is further found that the current public policy of the state of
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DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (1999).  Void and voidable marriages.
(a) A marriage is prohibited and void between a person and his or
her ancestor, descendant, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, niece, nephew,
first cousin or between persons of the same gender.
. . . .
(d) A marriage obtained or recognized outside the State between
persons prohibited by subsection (a) of this section shall not consti-
tute a legal or valid marriage within the State.
Amended 1996.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.04(1) (West 2004).  Marriage license issued.
No county court judge or clerk of the circuit court in this state
shall issue a license for the marriage of any person unless there shall
be first presented and filed with him or her an affidavit in writing,
signed by both parties to the marriage, . . . made and subscribed be-
fore some person authorized by law to administer an oath, reciting the
true and correct ages of such parties; unless both such parties shall be
over the age of 18 years, except as provided in s. 741.0405; and unless
one party is a male and the other party is a female.
Amended 1977.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212 (West Supp. 2005).  Marriages between
persons of the same sex.
(1) Marriages between persons of the same sex entered into in
any jurisdiction, whether within or outside the State of Florida, the
United States, or any other jurisdiction, either domestic or foreign, or
any other place or location, or relationships between persons of the
same sex which are treated as marriages in any jurisdiction, whether
within or outside the State of Florida, the United States, or any other
jurisdiction, either domestic or foreign, or any other place or location,
are not recognized for any purpose in this state.
(2) The state, its agencies, and its political subdivisions may not
give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any
state, territory, possession, or tribe of the United States or of any other
jurisdiction, either domestic or foreign, or any other place or location
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respecting either a marriage or relationship not recognized under
subsection (1) or a claim arising from such a marriage or relationship.
(3) For purposes of interpreting any state statute or rule, the term
“marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the term “spouse” applies only to a
member of such a union.
Passed 1997.
GA. CONST. art. 1, § 4, para. 1.  Recognition of marriage. 
(a) This state shall recognize as marriage only the union of man
and woman.  Marriages between persons of the same sex are prohib-
ited in this state.
(b) No union between persons of the same sex shall be recog-
nized by this state as entitled to the benefits of marriage.  This state
shall not give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of
any other state or jurisdiction respecting a relationship between per-
sons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of
such other state or jurisdiction.  The courts of this state shall have no
jurisdiction to grant a divorce or separate maintenance with respect to
any such relationship or otherwise to consider or rule on any of the
parties’ respective rights arising as a result of or in connection with
such relationship.
Passed 2004 by the voters.
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-30 (2004). Issuance, return, and recording of
license.
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GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (2004).  Marriages between persons of same
sex prohibited; marriages not recognized.
(a) It is declared to be the public policy of this state to recognize
the union only of man and woman. Marriages between persons of the
same sex are prohibited in this state.
(b) No marriage between persons of the same sex shall be recog-
nized as entitled to the benefits of marriage.  Any marriage entered
into by persons of the same sex pursuant to a marriage license issued
by another state or foreign jurisdiction or otherwise shall be void in
this state.  Any contractual rights granted by virtue of such license
shall be unenforceable in the courts of this state and the courts of this
state shall have no jurisdiction whatsoever under any circumstances to
grant a divorce or separate maintenance with respect to such marriage
or otherwise to consider or rule on any of the parties’ respective rights
arising as a result of or in connection with such marriage.
Passed 1996.
HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23.
The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to oppo-
site-sex couples.
Passed 1998 by the voters.
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572-1 (Michie Supp. 2003).  Requisites of
Valid Marriage Contract.
In order to make valid the marriage contract, which shall be only
between a man and a woman, it shall be necessary that . . . .
Amended 1994.
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572-1.6 (Michie Supp. 2003).  Private solem-
nization not unlawful.
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to render unlawful, or
otherwise affirmatively punishable at law, the solemnization of same-
sex relationships by religious organizations; provided that nothing in
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this section shall be construed to confer any of the benefits, burdens,
or obligations of marriage under the laws of Hawaii.
Passed 1994.
IDAHO CODE § 32-209 (Michie 1996).  Recognition of foreign or out-
of-state marriages.
All marriages contracted without this state, which would be valid
by the laws of the state or country in which the same were contracted,
are valid in this state, unless they violate the public policy of this state.
Marriages that violate the public policy of this state include, but are
not limited to, same-sex marriages, and marriages entered into under
the laws of another state or country with the intent to evade the pro-
hibitions of the marriage laws of this state.
Passed 1996.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/213.1 (West 1999).  Same-sex marriages;
public policy.
Same-sex marriages; public policy.  A marriage between 2 indi-
viduals of the same sex is contrary to the public policy of this State.
Passed 1996.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/212 (West 1999).  Prohibited marriages.
(a) The following marriages are prohibited:
. . .
(5) a marriage between 2 individuals of the same sex.
Amended 1996.
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-1-1 (West 1999).  Same sex marriages prohib-
ited.
(a) Only a female may marry a male.  Only a male may marry a
female.
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(b) A marriage between persons of the same gender is void in In-
diana even if the marriage is lawful in the place where it is solemnized.
Passed 1997.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.2 (West 2001).  Gender – Age.
1.  Only a marriage between a male and a female is valid.
Amended 1998.
KAN. CONST. art. 15, sec. 16.
(a) The marriage contract is to be considered in law as a civil con-
tract.  Marriage shall be constituted by one man and one woman only.
All other marriages are declared to be contrary to the public policy of
this state and are void.
(b) No relationship, other than a marriage, shall be recognized by
the state as entitling the parties to the rights or incidents of marriage.
Passed 2005 by the voters.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101 (2003).  Nature of marriage relation.
(a) The marriage contract is to be considered in law as a civil con-
tract between two parties who are of opposite sex.  All other marriages
are declared to be contrary to the public policy of this state and are
void. . . .
Amended 1996.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-115 (2003).  Validity of marriages contracted
without state.
All marriages contracted without this state, which would be valid
by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted, shall be
valid in all courts and places in this state.  It is the strong public policy
of this state only to recognize as valid marriages from other states that
are between a man and a woman.
Amended 1996.
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KY. CONST. § 233A
Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid
or recognized as a marriage in Kentucky.  A legal status identical or
substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals
shall not be valid or recognized.
Passed 2004 by the voters.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.040 (Michie 1999).  Marriage in another state.
(1) If any resident of this state marries in another state, the mar-
riage shall be valid here if valid in the state where solemnized, unless
the marriage is against Kentucky public policy.
(2) A marriage between members of the same sex is against Ken-
tucky public policy and shall be subject to the prohibitions established
in KRS 402.045.
Passed 1998.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.045 (Michie 1999).  Same-sex marriage in
another jurisdiction void and unenforceable.
(1) A marriage between members of the same sex which occurs in
another jurisdiction shall be void in Kentucky.
(2) Any rights granted by virtue of the marriage, or its termina-
tion, shall be unenforceable in Kentucky courts.
Passed 1998.
LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15.  Defense of Marriage.
Marriage in the state of Louisiana shall consist only of the union
of one man and one woman.  No official or court of the state of Lou-
isiana shall construe this constitution or any state law to require that
marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any mem-
ber of a union other than the union of one man and one woman.  A
legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for
unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized.  No official or
court of the state of Louisiana shall recognize any marriage contracted
in any other jurisdiction which is not the union of one man and one
woman.
Amended 2004 by the voters.
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LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 89 (West Supp. 2005).  Impediment of same
sex.
Persons of the same sex may not contract marriage with each
other.  A purported marriage between persons of the same sex con-
tracted in another state shall be governed by the provisions of Title II
of Book IV of the Civil Code.92
Effective 1988.  Amended 1999.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 96 (West 1999).  Civil effects of absolutely null
marriage; putative marriage.
An absolutely null marriage nevertheless produces civil effects in
favor of a party who contracted it in good faith for as long as that party
remains in good faith.
When the cause of the nullity is one party’s prior undissolved mar-
riage, the civil effects continue in favor of the other party, regardless
of whether the latter remains in good faith, until the marriage is pro-
nounced null or the latter party contracts a valid marriage.
A marriage contracted by a party in good faith produces civil ef-
fects in favor of a child of the parties.
A purported marriage between parties of the same sex does not
produce any civil effects.
Effective 1988.
92
Book IV of the Louisiana Civil Code deals with conflict of laws, and Title II of
that section, which comprises articles 3519-22, addresses matters of status.  Article 3519
provides that “[t]he status of a natural person and the incidents and effects of that
status are governed by the law of the state whose policies would be most seriously im-
paired if its law were not applied to the particular issue[,]” and that state is determined
by considering, inter alia, “the relationship of each state, at any pertinent time, to the
dispute, the parties, and the person whose status is at issue[,]” and “the policies of sus-
taining the validity of obligations voluntarily undertaken, of protecting children, mi-
nors, and others in need of protection, and of preserving family values and stability.”
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3519 (West 1999).  Article 3520(A) provides that public policy
can invalidate a marriage, but only if it is the public policy of the most interested state
under article 3519.  LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3520(A) (West Supp. 2005).  However,
article 3520(B), quoted infra p. 2178, evidently modifies this rule.
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
2178 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 2143
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3520(B) (West Supp. 2005).  Marriage.
A purported marriage between persons of the same sex violates a
strong public policy of the state of Louisiana and such a marriage con-
tracted in another state shall not be recognized in this state for any
purpose, including the assertion of any right or claim as a result of the
purported marriage.
Amended 1999.
H. Con. Res. 124, 1996 Reg. Sess. (La. 1996).
WHEREAS, the traditional marriage has become an issue in light
of the recent judicial decision in the state of Hawaii, which overturned
that state’s marriage laws and allowed persons of the same sex to
marry; and
WHEREAS, there is widespread concern that under the “full faith
and credit” clause of the United States Constitution, this decision may
impact marriage laws in other states across the nation; and
WHEREAS, the state of Louisiana has manifested through its laws
and in civilian theory, that the institution of marriage is one that sus-
tains order and morality in our communities and preserves the poster-
ity and well-being of our larger society; and
WHEREAS, our Civil Code defines marriage as a legal relationship
between a man and a woman created by civil contract; and
WHEREAS, a marriage between persons of the same sex is a legal
impediment to the contract of marriage in the state of Louisiana; and
WHEREAS, legislation has been introduced in the United States
Congress, entitled ‘The Defense of Marriage Act,’ which aims to pro-
tect the traditional definition of marriage as a legal union between
one man and one woman, and prevent mandatory recognition of
same sex marriages in other states; and
WHEREAS, this most important institution of our society must be
protected and preserved at all costs.
THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Legislature of Louisi-
ana expresses the sense of the legislature regarding the traditional
marital unit and the traditional definition of marriage in the state of
Louisiana.
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ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 650 (West 1998).  Findings and pur-
poses.
All municipal clerks and courts of this State shall have a duty and
shall be legally required to construe the provisions of Maine’s mar-
riage laws in accordance with the following findings and purposes:
1.  Findings.  The people of the State of Maine find that:
A. The union of one man and one woman joined in traditional
monogamous marriage is of inestimable value to society; the State has
a compelling interest to nurture and promote the unique institution
of traditional monogamous marriage in the support of harmonious
families and the physical and mental health of children; and that the
State has the compelling interest in promoting the moral values in-
herent in traditional monogamous marriage.
2.  Purposes.  The purposes of this chapter are:
A. To encourage the traditional monogamous family unit as the
basic building block of our society, the foundation of harmonious and
enriching family life;
B. To nurture, sustain and protect the traditional monogamous
family unit in Maine society, its moral imperatives, its economic func-
tion and its unique contribution to the rearing of healthy children;
and
C. To support and strengthen traditional monogamous Maine
families against improper interference from out-of-state influences or
edicts.
Passed 1997.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701 (West 1998).  Prohibited mar-
riages; exceptions.
1-A.  Certain marriages performed in another state not recognized
in this State.  Any marriage performed in another state that would vio-
late any provisions of subsections 2 to 5 if performed in this State is
not recognized in this State and is considered void if the parties take
up residence in this State.
. . . .
5.  Same sex marriage prohibited.  Persons of the same sex may
not contract marriage.
Amended 1997.
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MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (1999).  Valid marriages.
Only a marriage between a man and a woman is valid in this State.
Amended 1984.
MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25.  Marriage.
To secure and preserve the benefits of marriage for our society
and for future generations of children, the union of one man and one
woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as a mar-
riage or similar union for any purpose.
Passed 2004 by the voters.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.1 (West Supp. 2004).  Marriage be-
tween same sex, invalidity.
Sec. 1.  Marriage is inherently a unique relationship between a
man and a woman.  As a matter of public policy, this state has a special
interest in encouraging, supporting, and protecting that unique rela-
tionship in order to promote, among other goals, the stability and wel-
fare of society and its children.  A marriage contracted between indi-
viduals of the same sex is invalid in this state.
Passed 1996.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.271 (West Supp. 2004).  Marriages sol-
emnized in another state validated; exclusion of same sex marriages.
Sec. 1.  (1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, a marriage
contracted between a man and a woman who are residents of this state
and who were, at the time of the marriage, legally competent to con-
tract marriage according to the laws of this state, which marriage is
solemnized in another state within the United States by a clergyman,
magistrate, or other person legally authorized to solemnize marriages
within that state, is a valid and binding marriage under the laws of this
state to the same effect and extent as if solemnized within this state
and according to its laws.
(2) This section does not apply to a marriage contracted between
individuals of the same sex, which marriage is invalid in this state un-
der section 1 of chapter 83 of the revised statutes of 1846, being sec-
tion 551.1 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.
Amended 1996.
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MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.272 (West Supp. 2004).  Recognition of
marriage by state, same sex marriage invalid.
Sec. 2.  This state recognizes marriage as inherently a unique rela-
tionship between a man and a woman, as prescribed by section 1 of
chapter 83 of the revised statutes of 1846, being section 551.1 of the
Michigan Compiled Laws, and therefore a marriage that is not be-
tween a man and a woman is invalid in this state regardless of whether
the marriage is contracted according to the laws of another jurisdic-
tion.
Amended 1996.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.3 (West Supp. 2004).  Incapacity; per-
sons man prohibited from marrying.
Sec. 3.  A man shall not marry his mother, sister, grandmother,
daughter, granddaughter, stepmother, grandfather’s wife, son’s wife,
grandson’s wife, wife’s mother, wife’s grandmother, wife’s daughter,
wife’s granddaughter, brother’s daughter, sister’s daughter, father’s
sister, mother’s sister, or cousin of the first degree, or another man.
Amended 1996.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.4 (West Supp. 2004).  Incapacity; per-
sons woman prohibited from marrying.
Sec. 4.  A woman shall not marry her father, brother, grandfather,
son, grandson, stepfather, grandmother’s husband, daughter’s hus-
band, granddaughter’s husband, husband’s father, husband’s grand-
father, husband’s son, husband’s grandson, brother’s son, sister’s son,
father’s brother, mother’s brother, or cousin of the first degree, or
another woman.
Amended 1996.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.27 (West 2004).  Construction of law.
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to:
(1) mean the state of Minnesota condones homosexuality or bi-
sexuality or any equivalent lifestyle;
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(2) authorize or permit the promotion of homosexuality or bi-
sexuality in education institutions or require the teaching in educa-
tion institutions of homosexuality or bisexuality as an acceptable life-
style;
(3) authorize or permit the use of numerical goals or quotas, or
other types of affirmative action programs, with respect to homosexu-
ality or bisexuality in the administration or enforcement of the provi-
sions of this chapter; or
(4) authorize the recognition of or the right of marriage between
persons of the same sex.
Passed 1993.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01 (West Supp. 2005).  Marriage a civil con-
tract.
Marriage, so far as its validity in law is concerned, is a civil contract
between a man and a woman, to which the consent of the parties, ca-
pable in law of contracting, is essential.  Lawful marriage may be con-
tracted only between persons of the opposite sex and only when a li-
cense has been obtained as provided by law and when the marriage is
contracted in the presence of two witnesses and solemnized by one
authorized, or whom one or both of the parties in good faith believe
to be authorized, so to do.  Marriages subsequent to April 26, 1941,
not so contracted shall be null and void.
Amended 1997.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.03 (West Supp. 2005).  Prohibited marriages.
Subdivision 1.  General.  (a) The following marriages are prohib-
ited:
. . . .
(4) a marriage between persons of the same sex.
(b) A marriage entered into by persons of the same sex, either
under common law or statute, that is recognized by another state or
foreign jurisdiction is void in this state and contractual rights granted
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MISS. CONST. art. 14, § 263A.  Marriage.
Marriage may take place and may be valid under the laws of this
state only between a man and a woman.  A marriage in another state
or foreign jurisdiction between persons of the same gender, regardless
of when the marriage took place, may not be recognized in this state
and is void and unenforceable under the laws of this state.
Passed 2004 by the voters.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1 (1999).  Incestuous marriages void.
(2) Any marriage between persons of the same gender is prohib-
ited and null and void from the beginning.  Any marriage between
persons of the same gender that is valid in another jurisdiction does
not constitute a legal or valid marriage in Mississippi.
Amended 1997.
MO. CONST. art. I, § 33.
That to be valid and recognized in this state, a marriage shall exist
only between a man and a woman.
Passed 2004 by the voters.
MO. ANN. STAT. § 451.022 (West 2003).  Marriage, public policy, valid-
ity—marriage licenses, issued, when
1.  It is the public policy of this state to recognize marriage only
between a man and a woman.
2.  Any purported marriage not between a man and a woman is
invalid.
3.  No recorder shall issue a marriage license, except to a man and
a woman.
4.  A marriage between persons of the same sex will not be recog-
nized for any purpose in this state even when valid where contracted.
Amended 2001.
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MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7.  Marriage.
Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid
or recognized as a marriage in this state.
Passed 2004 by the voters.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401 (2003). Prohibited marriages—con-
tracts.
(1) The following marriage[ is] prohibited:
. . . .
(d) a marriage between persons of the same sex.
. . . .
(4) A contractual relationship entered into for the purpose of
achieving a civil relationship that is prohibited under subsection (1) is
void as against public policy.
Amended 1997.
NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29.  Marriage; same-sex relationships not valid or
recognized.
Only marriage between a man and a woman shall be valid or rec-
ognized in Nebraska.  The uniting of two persons of the same sex in a
civil union, domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex relation-
ship shall not be valid or recognized in Nebraska.
Passed 2000 by initiative.
NEV. CONST. art. I, § 21.  Limitation on recognition of marriage.
Only a marriage between a male and female person shall be rec-
ognized and given effect in this state.
Passed 2002 by initiative.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1 (2001).  Marriages Prohibited; Men.
No man shall marry his mother, his father’s sister, mother’s sister,
daughter, sister, son’s daughter, daughter’s daughter, brother’s
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daughter, sister’s daughter, father’s brother’s daughter, mother’s
brother’s daughter, father’s sister’s daughter, mother’s sister’s daugh-
ter, or any other man.
Amended 1987.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:2 (2001).  Marriages Prohibited; Women.
No woman shall marry her father, her father’s brother, mother’s
brother, son, brother, son’s son, daughter’s son, brother’s son, sister’s
son, father’s brother’s son, mother’s brother’s son, father’s sister’s
son, mother’s sister’s son, or any other woman.
Amended 1987.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (2003)  Marriages between persons of the
same gender not valid.
Marriages, whether created by common law, contracted, or per-
formed outside of North Carolina, between individuals of the same
gender are not valid in North Carolina.
Passed 1995.
N.D. CONST. art. XI, §  28.
Marriage consists only of the legal union between a man and a
woman.  No other domestic union, however denominated, may be
recognized as a marriage or given the same or substantially equivalent
legal effect.
Passed 2004 by the voters.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-01 (2004). What constitutes marriage—
Spouse defined.
Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract be-
tween one man and one woman to which the consent of the parties is
essential.  The marriage relation may be entered into, maintained,
annulled, or dissolved only as provided by law.  A spouse refers only to
a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.
Amended 1997.  Effective 2000.
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N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-08 (2004).  Foreign marriages recognized—
Exception.
Except when residents of this state contract a marriage in another
state which is prohibited under the laws of this state, all marriages
contracted outside this state, which are valid according to the laws of
the state or country where contracted, are valid in this state.  This sec-
tion applies only to a marriage contracted in another state or country
which is between one man and one woman as husband and wife.
Amended 1997.  Effective 2000.
Recognition of Foreign Marriages, ch. 145, sec. 3, §§ 14-03-01, 14-03-
08, 1997 N.D. Laws 3.
EFFECTIVE DATE.  If the legislature of another state enacts a law
under which a marriage between two individuals, other than between
one man and one woman, is a valid marriage in that state or the high-
est court of another state holds that under the law of that state a mar-
riage between two individuals, other than between one man and one
woman, is a valid marriage, the governor of this state shall certify that
fact to the legislative council.  The certification must include the ef-
fective date of the other state’s legislation or the date of the court de-
cision.  Sections 1 and 2 of this Act are effective as of the earlier of the
effective date of that law or the date of that decision.
Passed 1997.  Effective July 1, 2000, the date that Vermont granted the
benefits of marriage to same-sex couples forming a civil union.
OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11.  Defense of Marriage.
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a mar-
riage valid in or recognized by this state and its political subdivisions.
This state and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a
legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to
approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage.
Passed 2004 by initiative.
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OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (West 2005).  Persons who may marry;
same sex marriages against public policy; recognition or extension by
state of specific statutory benefits of legal marriage to nonmarital rela-
tionships against public policy.
(A) Male persons of the age of eighteen years, and female persons of
the age of sixteen years, not nearer of kin than second cousins, and not
having a husband or wife living, may be joined in marriage.  A marriage
may only be entered into by one man and one woman. . . .
. . . .
(C)(1) Any marriage between persons of the same sex is against the
strong public policy of this state.  Any marriage between persons of the
same sex shall have no legal force or effect in this state and, if attempted
to be entered into in this state, is void ab initio and shall not be recog-
nized by this state.
(2) Any marriage entered into by persons of the same sex in any other
jurisdiction shall be considered and treated in all respects as having no le-
gal force or effect in this state and shall not be recognized by this state.
(3) The recognition or extension by the state of the specific statutory
benefits of a legal marriage to nonmarital relationships between persons of
the same sex or different sexes is against the strong public policy of this
state.  Any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of this state, as defined
in section 9.82 of the Revised Code, that extends the specific statutory
benefits of legal marriage to nonmarital relationships between persons of
the same sex or different sexes is void ab initio.  Nothing in division (C)(3)
of this section shall be construed to do either of the following:
(a) Prohibit the extension of specific benefits otherwise enjoyed by
all persons, married or unmarried, to nonmarital relationships between
persons of the same sex or different sexes, including the extension of
benefits conferred by any statute that is not expressly limited to married
persons, which includes but is not limited to benefits available under
Chapter 4117. of the Revised Code;
(b) Affect the validity of private agreements that are otherwise valid
under the laws of this state.
(4) Any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other state,
country, or other jurisdiction outside this state that extends the specific
benefits of legal marriage to nonmarital relationships between persons of
the same sex or different sexes shall be considered and treated in all re-
spects as having no legal force or effect in this state and shall not be rec-
ognized by this state.
Passed 2004.
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OKLA. CONST. art. II,  § 35.  Marriage defined—Construction of law
and Constitution—Recognition of out-of-state marriages—Penalty.
A.  Marriage in this state shall consist only of the union of one
man and one woman.  Neither this Constitution nor any other provi-
sion of law shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal
incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.
B.  A marriage between persons of the same gender performed in
another state shall not be recognized as valid and binding in this state
as of the date of the marriage.
C.  Any person knowingly issuing a marriage license in violation of
this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Passed 2004 by referendum.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 3.1 (West 2001).  Recognition of marriage
between persons of same gender prohibited.
A marriage between persons of the same gender performed in
another state shall not be recognized as valid and binding in this state
as of the date of the marriage.
Passed 1996.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 3 (West Supp. 2005).  Who may marry.
A. Any person who is at least eighteen (18) years of age and not
otherwise disqualified is capable of contracting and consenting to
marriage with a person of the opposite sex.
Amended 1975.
OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a.
It is the policy of Oregon, and its political subdivisions, that only a
marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or legally
recognized as a marriage.
Passed 2004 by initiative.
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23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West 2001).  Marriage between per-
sons of the same sex.
It is hereby declared to be the strong and long standing public
policy of this Commonwealth that marriage shall be between one man
and one woman.  A marriage between persons of the same sex which
was entered into in another state or foreign jurisdiction, even if valid
where entered into, shall be void in this Commonwealth.
Passed 1996.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-10 (West Supp. 2004).  Persons who may con-
tract matrimony.
(A) All persons, except mentally incompetent persons and per-
sons whose marriage is prohibited by this section, may lawfully con-
tract matrimony.
(B) No man shall marry his mother, grandmother, daughter,
granddaughter, stepmother, sister, grandfather’s wife, son’s wife,
grandson’s wife, wife’s mother, wife’s grandmother, wife’s daughter,
wife’s granddaughter, brother’s daughter, sister’s daughter, father’s
sister, mother’s sister, or another man.
(C) No woman shall marry her father, grandfather, son, grandson,
stepfather, brother, grandmother’s husband, daughter’s husband,
granddaughter’s husband, husband’s father, husband’s grandfather,
husband’s son, husband’s grandson, brother’s son, sister’s son, fa-
ther’s brother, mother’s brother, or another woman.
Amended 1996.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (West Supp. 2004).  Prohibition of same sex
marriage.
A marriage between persons of the same sex is void ab initio and
against the public policy of this State.
Passed 1996.
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
2190 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 2143
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-1 (Michie 1999).  Marriage defined—Con-
sent and solemnization required.
Marriage is a personal relation, between a man and a woman, aris-
ing out of a civil contract to which the consent of parties capable of
making it is necessary. Consent alone does not constitute a marriage;
it must be followed by a solemnization.
Amended 1996.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113 (2001).  Marriage between one man and
one woman only legally recognized marital contract.
(a) Tennessee’s marriage licensing laws reinforce, carry forward,
and make explicit the long-standing public policy of this state to rec-
ognize the family as essential to social and economic order and the
common good and as the fundamental building block of our society.
To that end, it is further the public policy of this state that the histori-
cal institution and legal contract solemnizing the relationship of one
(1) man and one (1) woman shall be the only legally recognized mari-
tal contract in this state in order to provide the unique and exclusive
rights and privileges to marriage.
(b) The legal union in matrimony of only one (1) man and one
(1) woman shall be the only recognized marriage in this state.
(c) Any policy, law or judicial interpretation that purports to de-
fine marriage as anything other than the historical institution and le-
gal contract between one (1) man and one (1) woman is contrary to
the public policy of Tennessee.
(d) If another state or foreign jurisdiction issues a license for per-
sons to marry which marriages are prohibited in this state any such
marriage shall be void and unenforceable in this state.
Passed 1996.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.001 (Vernon 1998).  Marriage License.
(a) A man and a woman desiring to enter into a ceremonial
marriage shall obtain a marriage license from the county clerk of any
county of this state.
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TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204 (Vernon Supp. 2004–2005).  Recogni-
tion of Same-Sex Marriage or Civil Union.
(a) In this section, “civil union” means any relationship status
other than marriage that:
(1) is intended as an alternative to marriage or applies primarily
to cohabitating persons; and
(2) grants to the parties of the relationship legal protections,
benefits, or responsibilities granted to the spouses of a marriage.
(b) A marriage between persons of the same sex or a civil union is
contrary to the public policy of this state and is void in this state.
(c) The state or an agency or political subdivision of the state may
not give effect to a:
(1) public act, record, or judicial proceeding that creates, recog-
nizes, or validates a marriage between persons of the same sex or a
civil union in this state or in any other jurisdiction; or
(2) right or claim to any legal protection, benefit, or responsibility
asserted as a result of a marriage between persons of the same sex or a
civil union in this state or in any other jurisdiction.
Passed 2003.
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29.  Marriage.
(1) Marriage consists only of the legal union between a man and a
woman.
(2) No other domestic union, however denominated, may be rec-
ognized as a marriage or given the same or substantially equivalent le-
gal effect.
Passed 2004 by the voters.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (1998).  Marriages prohibited and void.
The following marriages are prohibited and declared void:
. . . .
(5) between persons of the same sex.
Amended in 1993.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4 (1998).  Validity of foreign marriages—Ex-
ceptions.
A marriage solemnized in any other country, state, or territory, if
valid where solemnized, is valid here, unless it is a marriage:
(1) that would be prohibited and declared void in this state, un-
der Subsection 30-1-2 (1), (3), or (5); or
(2) between parties who are related to each other within and in-
cluding three degrees of consanguinity, except as provided in Subsec-
tion 30-1-1(2).
Amended 1996.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.1 (2005).  Marriage recognition policy.
(1) (a) It is the policy of this state to recognize as marriage only
the legal union of a man and a woman as provided in this chapter.
(b) Except for the relationship of marriage between a man and a
woman recognized pursuant to this chapter, this state will not recog-
nize, enforce, or give legal effect to any law creating any legal status,
rights, benefits, or duties that are substantially equivalent to those
provided under Utah law to a man and a woman because they are
married.
(2) Nothing in Subsection (1) impairs any contract or other
rights, benefits, or duties that are enforceable independently of this
section.
Passed 2004.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2002).  Marriage definition.
Marriage is the legally recognized union of one man and one
woman.
Passed 1999.
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (Michie 2004).  Marriage between persons of
same sex.
A marriage between persons of the same sex is prohibited. Any
marriage entered into by persons of the same sex in another state or
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jurisdiction shall be void in all respects in Virginia and any contractual
rights created by such marriage shall be void and unenforceable.
Amended 1997.
VA. CODE ANN. S 20-45.3 (Michie 2004).  Civil unions between persons
of the same sex.
A civil union, partnership contract or other arrangement between
persons of the same sex purporting to bestow the privileges or obliga-
tions of marriage is prohibited.  Any such civil union, partnership con-
tract or other arrangement entered into by persons of the same sex in
another state or jurisdiction shall be void in all respects in Virginia




WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 (West Supp. 2004–2005).  Marriage
contract—void marriages.
(1) Marriage is a civil contract between a male and a female who
have each attained the age of eighteen years, and who are otherwise
capable.
Amended 1998.
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.020 (West Supp. 2004–2005).  Marriage
contract—void marriages.
(1) Marriages in the following cases are prohibited:
. . . .
(c) When the parties are persons other than a male and a female.
. . . .
(3) A marriage between two persons that is recognized as valid in
another jurisdiction is valid in this state only if the marriage is not
prohibited or made unlawful under subsection (1)(a), (1)(c), or (2)
of this section.
Amended 1998.
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W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-104 (Michie 2004).  Contents of the applica-
tion for a marriage license.
. . . .
(c) Every application for a marriage license must contain the fol-
lowing statement:  “Marriage is designed to be a loving and lifelong
union between a woman and a man.
“The laws of this state affirm your right to enter into this marriage
and to live within the marriage free from violence and abuse.  Neither
of you is the property of the other.  Physical abuse, sexual abuse, bat-
tery and assault of a spouse or other family member, and other provi-
sions of the criminal laws of this state are applicable to spouses and
other family members, and these violations are punishable by law.”
Amended 2001.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-603 (Michie 2004)  Certain acts, records, and
proceedings not to be given effect in this state.
A public act, record or judicial proceeding of any other state, ter-
ritory, possession or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of
the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of the other
state, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from
such relationship, shall not be given effect by this state.
Amended 2001.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101 (Michie 2003).  Marriage a civil contract.
Marriage is a civil contract between a male and a female person to
which the consent of the parties capable of contracting is essential.
Amended 1977.
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